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Abstract: The influence of hormones and biology on behavior is a topic that is rife with controversy, especially 
when it comes to sexual hormones. There is even more murkiness when it comes to the topic of menstruation and 
knowledge about women’s menstrual cycles. Recent research on this topic have seen a link between the hormonal 
fluctuations during menstrual cycles and various behavioral implications on competition, cooperation, and risk 
behavior. This study tries to expand existing knowledge by examining whether there is a link between hormonal 
fluctuations during menstrual cycles and risk preferential behavior using economic experiments in the largely 
understudied context of Sierra Leone. I also attempt to quantify the impact of stigma around menstruation on self-
reported personal well-being indices.  Deviating from existing literature, I find that the luteal phase of the 
menstrual cycle has a significant effect on risk preferential behavior. Additionally, there is a significant relationship 




1. Introduction and Problem Statement: 
  
In most societies, there has been an established pattern of girls having worse outcomes than 
boys. This can be observed through worse health outcomes, disempowerment, and 
disproportional impacts of poverty. In Sierra Leone, women’s reproductive health can be clearly 
surmised by the maternal mortality rate. For every live 100,000 births, an estimated 1165 
maternal deaths happen (WHO, 2017). Women are believed to be more affected by poverty 
than men. In Latin America, women are 34 percent more likely than men to belong to the 
lowest 20 percent of the income distribution (Korzeniewicz, 2000).  A recent World Bank study 
also found that poverty rates are highest amongst girl children. For every 100 boys there are 
105 girls living in extreme poverty, and this gender gap gets worse as girls get older and reach 
fertility. The expectations are that women would stop working and take care of the children 
and the household, thus leading to them not exercising their productivity potential in the 
workplace (World Bank, 2018).  
There are institutional factors and patterns that lead to women having lower life outcomes. 
Cultural beliefs on gender roles lead to women getting married early or forego education in 
order to care for children and the elderly. Women’s education is vital in improving life 
outcomes for everyone in the household, and in turn the whole economy. It is a well-recognized 
phenomenon in the Sub-Saharan context that this study is based in that girls have lower school 
attendance than boys. In the country of interest for this study—Sierra Leone, this kind of 
disparity exists and is higher in rural areas. It has been observed that boys have a higher net 
school attendance than girls. In rural areas, the female: male ratio of school attendance is 0.67. 
This disparity exists despite having access to government provided primary education (Moyi, 
2013).  
An important focus in global development now is to uplift the status of women. The UN’s 
Sustainable Development Goals highlight the issue by adding Gender Equality as one of its 
prominent ideals. On the implementation side of development economics as well there is a great 
interest in designing studies and interventions that deal with increasing women’s health and 
economic outcomes. Educational subsidies, such as free uniforms, have proven to be very useful 
in increasing school attendance, along with reduction of early marriage and teen pregnancies 
(Duflo et al, 2014).  While these studies tackle the external ways in which development and 
empowerment can occur, there is also a growing interest in how intrinsic preferences and 
cultural beliefs might explain economic trends and behavior amongst the poor. Individual 
  
human beliefs and instincts have proven to be more powerful than scientifically designed 
interventions and rigorous evaluations (Banerjee et al, 2009, Pulford et al, 2011).   
Understanding the exact causal factors for intrinsic behaviors will improve the quality of 
development economics research and contribute towards more effective policymaking. 
Behavioral concepts such as risk aversion and competition have always played a role in 
economics. Structural economic theories highlight the role that risk plays in decision making. 
There is also an observed gender differential in the expression of risk behavior. Women tend to 
be more risk averse than men (Charness and Gneezy, 2012, Eckel and Grossman, 2008). This 
aspect of behavior could potentially dictate all decision making, from choice of occupation to 
child rearing. Understanding the reasons for certain preferences could help design better 
interventions that will promote women’s educational attainment and labor force participation.  
Another aspect of women’s lives that isn’t frequently addressed is menstruation. Menstruation 
is associated with pain and discomfort, as well as stigma in most societies. It has been observed 
by studies conducted by UNICEF that in Sierra Leone, there are more than 20% of girls who 
are absent while they are menstruating, and in Nepal and Afghanistan there are 30% of girls 
who do not show up to school (Sommer et al, 2012). There is the problem of stigma associated 
with menstruation that usually comes with feelings of uncleanness and shame. It has been seen 
that girls’ school performance also declines after they have had menarche (Tegagne and Sisay, 
2014). It is also salient that lack of access to good products, as well as ignorance on the subject 
leads to reproductive tract infections among girls, and they are ill-equipped to handle these 
health issues (Kaur et al, 2017).  
While decision making is affected by risk preferences, it is unknown to what extent hormones 
could affect risk preferences. The main question I am attempting to tackle is whether hormonal 
fluctuations during a menstrual cycle affect risk loving and competitive behavior amongst 
schoolchildren in Sierra Leone. Using biologist Dr. Martie Hasselton’s work in the book 
Hormonal (2018) as the guiding principle, I am attempting to study the link between hormonal 
fluctuations and risk behavior in a global development context. This study attempts to examine 
the extent and magnitude of this connection amongst Sierra Leonean school children by 
quantifying behavior using economic experiments, while tracking hormonal information 
through self-reported menstrual cycles. Studies using economic experiments are traditionally 
  
conducted in a somewhat sterile lab setting in Western countries. The results from these 
studies cannot be generalized for a worldly context. Conducting this research in under-studied 
Sierra Leone provides further insight into how these preferences are manifested.  
Economic games were conducted in six schools in rural areas of Sierra Leone, mainly around 
three bigger cities (Freetown, Makeni, and Kenema). Using a sample size of 253(159 girls and 
94 boys), the Competition game and Risk Game were conducted in a classroom setting. We find 
that girls that menstruate are on average more competitive than non-menstruating girls and 
boys. Previous literature has claimed that women are more competitive and risk loving during 
the ovulatory phase of their menstrual cycle. I find that menstruating schoolgirls1 in Sierra 
Leone are more risk loving during the luteal phase of the menstrual cycle. This is also the 
phase when Pre-Menstrual Syndrome is common, and girls in our sample show high risk 
preference during this phase. I also find that cash incentives are more successful in eliciting 
competitive behavior, rather than tangible prizes.  
This introduction will be followed by a comprehensive literature review in Section 2, then a 
thorough outline of the experimental design and sampling in Section 3. Section 4 showcases the 
key results for OLS regressions and contains the added panel regressions for competition. 
Section 5 presents a discussion and conclusion.  
2. Literature Review 
The literature review will go through existing literature on the theory of female empowerment 
and how it relates to human capital theory, and how development economics is addressing the 
issue. Then it will offer a comprehensive review on the role of risk in economics, experiments 
on risk and what kind of behaviors are being elicited. Adding to that, I will look at results of 
risk experiments from lab and field settings. I will then explain in detail how Dr. Hasselton’s 
work will inform my research, and how we will add to the expanding well of knowledge in this 
field.  
2.1 Female empowerment and human capital theory 
                                                      
1 Menstruating girls are girls that have reached menarche and regularly menstruate. This does not necessarily 
mean that the girls are on their period during the time of study.  
  
One of the most widely cited papers on female empowerment in the field of development 
economics is by Esther Duflo. She provides many examples as to why interventions increasing 
women’s confidence and empowerment may be instrumental in improving economic outcomes 
for the whole society. She also draws an important conclusion that it might be necessary to 
focus on empowerment in an unequitable manner- women vs men. More attention needs to be 
paid to women’s empowerment and policies should be geared towards that (Duflo, 2012).  
Human capital theory is a well-known theory about how the increases in education and 
experience lead to increase in production. Education is a necessary and important input in the 
outcomes of production. Gary Becker’s pioneering work in this topic lends the basis for a 
possible causal relationship between human capital accumulation and growth in income. He 
claims that in the US, attaining high school and college education increases a person’s income, 
even after accounting for the direct and indirect costs of schooling (Becker, 1994). He also 
attributes the consistent growth of countries like the US, Japan, and European nations to 
expansion of technical and scientific knowledge that increases the productivity of labor and 
inputs of production.  
My study is trying to understand how we can utilize the link between hormones and behavior 
to influence empowerment, and in turn lead to higher human capital accumulation.  
2.2 Risk and Competition Experiments Theory 
Risk and Competition are aspects of behavior that tend to move together. Being competitive 
has an element of risk-loving attached to it. The field of experimental economics has come up 
with many ways to objectively measure these behaviors. Some of the ways to measure risk 
include the Balloon Analogue Risk Task, Gneezy and Potters method, Eckel and Grossman 
method, and the multiple price list method (Charness and Gneezy, 2012). My study uses a 
variation of the multiple price list method.  
The literature on competition, especially those focusing on gender differentials in competition 
rely on the method standardized by Niederle and Vesturland. This involves solving some sort 
of a task in a non-competitive atmosphere first, followed by an incentivized competitive set up, 
thus eliciting subjects’ competitive preferences (Niederle and Vesturland, 2007). My study uses 
the exact set up of this competition game, and adds a layer derived from the work of Cassar et 
  
al, where subjects perform a math-based task and choose between a non-competitive piece rate 
round and a competitive incentivized tournament round (Cassar et al, 2016).  
2.3 Risk and Development Economics 
Risk is an essential step in any decision-making process. Specifically, in the context of economic 
development that deals in a lot of behavioral change mechanisms, risk preferences need to be 
accounted for. Klasing(2014) addresses this exact concept. The author looks at endogeneity in 
risk attitudes in a standard endogenous growth model. She implements the Romer growth 
model (innovations through entrepreneurship are responsible for economic growth) but 
modifies it by adding an uncertain innovation process which is influenced by heterogenous risk 
attitudes. The paper details the model accounting for the production structure of a model 
economy, and how occupational choices are influenced by an intergenerational transmission of 
risk attitudes. The conclusion drawn by the paper says that interventions promoting 
entrepreneurial behavior will be successful if they increase the risky-ness of individuals. 
Individuals are inherently risk-averse, and higher impacts can be achieved with interventions if 
they are successful in reducing risk-averseness.  
The literature around job seeking and migration are heavily based on the ideas of risk aversion 
and risk loving behavior. Rural to urban migration often leads to higher income, but migration 
is a risky endeavor and the models that explain it take this into consideration (Fields, 1974). 
There have been studies that look at risk aversion as a cultural trait and try to explain 
economic development using this framework (Burton, 2015).   
Using this idea of reducing risk averseness and applying it to a real-world scenario that uses 
behavioral and cultural change, we get a great example in birth control pills. Birth control pills 
offer women more control over their childbearing decisions. Pills reduce the riskiness that 
childbearing has over women’s labor market participation and educational attainment. This in 
turn leads to better life outcomes for women. There have been multiple studies conducted in 
this topic, the most illustrious one from Goldin and Katz (2000).  
They see that women’s participation in professional programs went up substantially around 
1970, and age at first marriage also increased around the same time. Looking at the spread of 
birth control pills in the late 1960s amongst single women, they conclude that the introduction 
  
of the pill reduced the cost of having sex, and then subsequently increased a career woman’s 
likelihood of finding an assortative mate after professional school. The lesson that can be 
derived from these studies is that knowledge about risk attitudes can be helpful, and 
interventions that target reducing costs associated with risky behavior have a greater chance at 
success.  
There have been many field experiments conducted to understand risk behavior and how they 
affect different kinds of decision making. The seminal work on this topic was done by 
Binswanger in rural India. The paper follows an experiment in rural India conducted by 
ICRISAT (International Crops Research Institute for the semi-Arid Tropics). The paper found 
a relationship between the variation in individual farmers’ agricultural decisions and variations 
in risk aversion. They found that farmers who are more risk averse take conservative 
agricultural decisions (Binswanger, 1981). Using the results from this paper, a lab experiment 
was done in three US universities by Holt and Laury in 2002. In this paper, the authors address 
the issues associated with risk aversion modeling by giving subjects simple choice tasks, such as 
lottery choices involving legitimate large cash prices. They can compare behavior under real 
and hypothetical incentives (Holt and Laury, 2002). 
Most studies on risk attitudes deal with agricultural decision making. My study will add an 
element of influence through hormones on risk behavior, as well as a non-lab setting in a Sub-
Saharan African nation.  
2.4 Hormones and Behaviors 
A human female’s ovulatory/menstrual cycle is very subtle when compared to other animals in 
nature. The ebbs and flows of hormones cannot be seen through any overt physical changes in 
humans. Dr. Martie Hasselton, however, asserts that there is a change in behavior 
corresponding to different points within the cycle. She says that ovulating women tend to 
socialize more, are open to meeting more men, dance in ways that are rated in studies as more 
attractive, walk more, eat less, and flirt more than they do at other times. Another major 
insight that she offers is that during times of high estrogen production women tend to be more 
competitive, and during times of higher progesterone levels women tend to be more 
cooperative.  
  
Using these main insights and the knowledge we have on our subjects’ monthly menstrual 
cycles; we can surmise when they have higher estrogen levels and when they have higher 
progesterone levels. Using this information and matching that to their responses on the 
economic games, we can observe risk loving or risk averse behavior and also derive insights on 
competition preferences.   
An emerging interest in the field of experimental economics is conducting games in the context 
of menstrual cycles. Competition is being measured at different stages of the menstrual cycle 
with a variety of games. Some use a math task as outlined in the competition experiments 
literature and outline the outcomes against different stages of the menstrual cycle (Wozniak et 
al, 2014). Some have used the setup of an auction to gain insights into the impact of hormone 
cycles. In Western societies, with the prevalence of synthetic hormones as contraception, it 
adds an additional layer to the measurement of competition during different stages of the 
menstrual cycle (Schipper et al., 2013). 
2.5 Menstruation and Social Stigma 
Menstruation is a taboo subject in most settings. Studies in this topic have focused on how this 
stigma leads to disempowerment of women. Girls’ school performance dips due to 
menstruation. Tegagne and Sisay’s 2014 study amongst 595 girls in Ethiopia found that girls 
who experienced teasing and shaming by classmates due to staining during menstruation 
tended to drop out of school. It was also seen that school attendance dipped due to lack of 
sanitary products and sanitation facilities at schools (Tegagne and Sisay, 2014). Menstruation 
and stigma around it also produce gender inequality and creates a disparity in access to social 
resources. In Sub-Saharan Africa, it is seen that there is a lack of preparation for menarche, 
issues with menstrual hygiene, and a prevalence of sexual transactions as a way to pay for 
sanitary products (Mason et al, 2008; Phillips-Howard, 2015; Jewitt and Riley, 2014).  
Examining menstruation in the context of overall well-being will help understand the 
phenomenon better and reduce the disadvantaged treatment of girls that comes with it. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Sampling  
  
Our study was conducted across three provinces in Sierra Leone with the collaboration of 
BRAC- Sierra Leone. BRAC is a global NGO and microfinance organization that has a great 
reach all over Sierra Leone. They provided us with the logistical support required to complete 
this project successfully.  Three main cities (Freetown, Makeni, and Kenema) was selected and 
list of villages was compiled around the perimeter of these cities. We then randomly selected 
two schools from each area. A map of the relevant locations can be found in the appendix.  
Each experimental session consisted of three rounds of experiments, conducted at the school in 
a group setting. We conducted the Competition Experiment, Willingness-to-Pay exercise and a 
simple lottery style Risk game. Demographic surveys were conducted after the experimental 
sessions. These included self-reported feelings of well-being and confidence, measured on a 
Likert scale. Our final sample size for the experiments is 257 (159 girls and 94 boys). The 
surveys conducted contained more questions about self-esteem and confidence, which were used 
to conduct our indices. The sample size for the surveys was a total of 810 girls.  
3.1.1 Balance Checks and Sample distributions 
Our sample is balanced for the most part. About 20% of our sample hasn’t reached menarche 
yet. The average age of this subset is 13 years. The average age for the sample that has reached 
menarche and experiences menstruation on a periodic basis is close to 15 years. The majority of 
the girls in our sample are in grade JSS2, the equivalent of 8th grade in the US educational 
system. Our sample is also predominantly Muslim, which is accurate given the composition of 
the general population of Sierra Leone. In the balance table presented in the appendix (Table 1), 
the self-reported risk preferences of our sample are also included. A large part of our sample 
categorizes itself as being neutral towards risk, with a huge proportion making up the middle of 
the distribution. The p-value for that specific variable is also quite significant, indicating that 
we need to control for risk through other methods. We also find that quite a large number of 
our subjects reside in polygynous houses, which is relevant in the setting that we are working 
in.  
This lends perfectly into using the Risk game. The exogenous variation we are looking for is 
given by the random occurrence of menstruation amongst our sample. The risk game also looks 
at risk in a more objective way when compared to the self-reported measures given in the table 
  
below.  Using a randomized process of the experiment, we can also do away with the need for a 
lot of controls to account for exogenous variation in estimates.  
3.2 Research Design 
The main outcomes that I will be observing are two-fold. The first part deals with behaviors in 
the Risk Game, Competition for cash2, and Competition for Prizes3. This will use only the 
subset of the sample that participated in the experiments.  The second part focuses on the well-
being indices and their relationship with menstruation. This will use the entire sample that was 
administered the entire survey. My hypothesis is that when girls in our sample are closer to 
their peak ovulation periods, they will be more risk loving and will exhibit that in the 
experiments. The null hypothesis is that hormones will have no effect on preferences in 
economic games. The alternative would be that we see girls showing more risk preferential 
behavior in the experiment when it is projected to be their peak fertility period.  
3.2.1 Experiments Set up 
The main experiment we are using to estimate risk behavior is the simple Lottery Risk Game. 
This game also acts as a control for other experiments that we conducted with the sample. It 
uses a simple framework to elicit risk preferences from subjects. To provide a brief overview of 
the game, it starts out as a series of binary choices A or B. It starts with the least risky choice, 
where the subject can earn an equal amount of money. In our case, this was 10,000 leones for 
each option. The choices get increasingly more risk loving, with the second choice being (8000 
le, 12,000 le) being the choices. It keeps changing in increments of two, until the final option is 
the most risk loving— (0. 20,000le). After subjects have clearly indicated their preferred option, 
a coin is tossed and either option A or option B is declared the winner. Each subject is awarded 
the corresponding money amount as their preferred choice and taking the winning side into 
consideration.  
The outcome of the game through the coin toss is not something that we are very interested in. 
We are mostly interested in how the risk preferences are expressed in terms of the choices of 
                                                      
2Cash- Possibility of winning up to 20,000 leones= equivalent of $2.5 USD. 
3 Prizes- School supplies with notebooks and a geometry set.  
 
  
A/B options. This is what I will be looking at mainly, the variable of the Risk Score. Attached 
in the appendix is the sheet that was used in administering the experiments at the schools.  
The Risk Game also acts as a control for the Competition Experiment also conducted in a 
corresponding study in this overall project. Competitiveness and risk are highly interconnected 
and examining them together will offer a more complete picture for the behavioral preferences 
that are being studied.  
The competition game involves a simple math addition task. Subjects are given a mandatory 
piece-rate, where points are awarded based only on their performance, then they are given a 
mandatory tournament round, where their performance is measured against another randomly 
assigned competitor. They are awarded points only if they are able to score more than their 
competitor. After these mandatory rounds, the incentives are changed for each subsequent 
round, and the subjects can choose which style of activity they would like to participate in. If 
they choose tournament in the subsequent rounds, we can measure their competition 
preferences. A full description of the experiment protocols, payout schemes, and score sheets 
are given in the appendix.  
3.2.2 Indices 
The indices are a simple Kling index creating an aggregate of the responses to questions about 
self-esteem and beliefs on menstruation. For the Period index, the survey included questions on 
allowed practices during menstruation and how they feel about themselves during 
menstruation. The school index included questions on whether they enjoy studying, sports, and 
extra-curricular activities at school. The happiness and stress indices are standard questions 
about self-esteem and measures of self-reported well-being. The survey questionnaire attached 
in the appendix can clarify the exact nature of the questions that go into the index.  
3.2.3 Model 
I will be running an OLS regression (interpreted as a Linear Probability model), as well as a 
logit model as the main Y-variable for risk score is a categorical variable. Given below is the 
regression specification for both models: 
  
𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑂𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑜.  𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+  𝛽4𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑒 +  𝜀𝑖 
The Y- variable comprises of the following outcome measures: 
• Experimental Outcomes: Risk Score, Competition for Cash, Competition for Prize 
• Wellbeing Indices: Negative feelings about Periods, School Interest, Stress, Happiness.  
For the variables ‘Days since menstrual onset’ and ‘distance from peak ovulation’, I considered 
the date that the subject had her last menstrual period and estimated a cycle from that. I 
assumed a cycle higher than the normal based on the age of the subjects, as we are dealing with 
teenagers whose hormones are still adjusting and regulating. For subjects that are younger 
than 16, I assumed a cycle length of 33 days. For subjects older than 16, a 28-day cycle was 
ascribed. The rest of the variables in our regression are controls and fixed effects for religion, 
age, grade, and school. In addition to OLS regressions, I will also be conducting some logistic 
regressions, along with a panel that encompasses overall competition preferences.  
To further analyze the menstrual cycle, the subjects in my sample were assigned dummies for 
the exact stage of the cycle that they were in during the time of study. For example, if a subject 
was in the 10th day of her self-reported menstrual cycle on the day of the experiments, she was 
assigned to the ovulatory phase category and given a dummy value of 1. This was done to see if 
the effects of specific phases can be further isolated, and the thresholds for determining the 
phases were derived from Schipper et al (2013) study explained in Section 2.  
4. Results 
4.1 Risk Preferences 
The first OLS regressions for risk show that your position from peak ovulation relative to the 
date of the experiment has no significant effect on the Risk Score. Table 2 explains these 
results. The highest significance score is assigned to the estimates of the school variable in the 
regression. In the case of Sierra Leone, schools act as an excellent proxy for income. The 
schools in Kenema and Makeni are being compared to the more prosperous and cosmopolitan 
location of Freetown. Based on these comparisons, we see a highly significant negative 
relationship with risk-loving behavior.   
  
In order to further clarify these results, I divide my sample of menstruating girls into 
categories of the different stages of the menstrual cycle based on their respective cycles. The 
categories are pre-menstrual, menstruating, follicular, luteal, and peri-menstrual. More details 
about these stages and the menstrual cycle can be found in the appendix. Adding these dummy 
variables into the regression, the strongest correlation with the risk preference is found during 
the luteal phase. Table 3 shows these results. We see a highly significant result for all the 
models specified for the luteal phase category. This goes against literature, as progesterone is 
associated with lower competition and more cooperation.  
Figures 4 and 5 show us comparisons between different subjects in terms of their risk 
preferences. We see that girls that menstruate are on average more risk-loving than girls that 
do not. We also see that girls that menstruate report a higher risk-preference compared to boys 
in our sample.  
4.2 Competition 
The competition game had two possible incentives to choose from, and these choices will act as 
our dependent variable for the regressions. Figure 6 shows us the breakdown of choices for 
different categories of our sample. Here, we see that overall our subjects were strongly 
influenced by the cash incentive and proportion of people choosing to compete is higher in 
totality. In both case, males were more competitive than females. For the cash round, non-
menstruating girls are more competitive, with 75% of non-menstruating girls choosing 
tournament compared to 71.75% of menstruating girls.  
Moving on to the regressions presented in tables 4 and 5, we see again that the position from 
peak ovulation has no significant relationship with the subjects’ choice of tournament for either 
cash or tournament. There are slightly significant results for one of the schools. For the cash 
round, we see that Largo-Kenema has highly significant results. This might further support the 
fact that cash is a huge incentive for a rural isolated region like Kenema. We see no such 
significance for the prize incentive in our OLS regressions. Conducting OLS regressions with 
the categories for different stages of the menstrual cycle doesn’t shed any light on the 
relationship between menstrual cycles and competition.  
4.2.1 Panel Regressions for Competition 
  
In order to better understand the overall level of competition, I created a panel for the sample 
using competition in both rounds. This acts as a difference-in-difference estimator for the 
competition between both the rounds for different categories of my sample. We see in table 6 
that being female has a significant impact on likelihood of competition. Females compete less on 
average compared to the males in the sample. There is a positive sign regarding female 
competition for the cash round, but it is not significant.  
Table 7 compares menstruating girls to non-menstruating girls. Menstruation has a positive 
non-significant relationship with overall competition. We also see that menstruating girls on 
average are less likely to compete for cash, as we see a negative sign for the interaction 
variable. This is not significant, however. This specification reiterates that confidence has a 
positive and significant relationship with the choice to compete for cash.  
4.3 Well-being Indices 
The well-being indices that I will be looking at are feeling about periods, feelings about school, 
happiness, and stress. Tables 8 through 11 summarize these results. For the index on negative 
feelings about periods, we see that menstruating girls have a highly significant coefficient. This 
implies that the stigma around menstruation is very strong in this context. They have a strong 
negative connection to menstruation and their self-esteem during menstruation.  
In terms of feelings about school, it seems that the school you attend, and the area you live in 
has a tremendous impact on how you feel about school. We see that compared to the Freetown 
schools, the subjects in our sample from other locations have a significant negative connection 
with their schools. School size might also play a role in this, as the schools with the most 
significant estimates are large schools with a lot of students coming in from various 
surrounding villages. Menstruation seems to play no role in how our subjects feel about school.  
The indices on stress and happiness echo the results we would expect. Both the menstruation 
and the school variables are highly significant and pointing in the appropriate direction. 
Subjects that are past menarche experience stress in a significant manner. Correspondingly, 
they experience a negative relationship with happiness. They are on average less happy than 
subjects that do not menstruate.  
  
5. Discussion 
This study used menstrual cycles and menstruation to examine well-being and behavior 
amongst school children in Sierra Leone. There have been studies conducted on these topics in 
developed countries usually in the Western hemisphere. There is a new interest in how 
hormones dictate behavior, and there has been an ongoing interest in how stigma around 
menstruation affects self-esteem and personal well-being. My study attempted to implement 
these theories in the largely understudied context of Sierra Leone. Set in rural areas around 
Freetown, Makeni, and Kenema, economic games were conducted in classrooms with a total 
sample size of 159 girls and 94 boys.   
By using experimental economics methodologies to objectively measure risk and competitive 
preferences, along with self-reported menstrual cycles, I tried to see if hormonal fluctuations 
affect behavior. We don’t see the expected relationship between menstrual cycles and behavior. 
However, we see that girls in the luteal phase of their menstrual cycle exhibit risk loving 
behavior rather than during the ovulatory phase as literature shows. Additionally, we see a 
highly significant connection between schools and location of the subjects with the outcomes in 
the games. This points to the fact that income and poverty are a bigger influence on behavior 
than menstrual cycles specifically. Locations that are more isolated and poorer are highly 
incentivized by cash options and exhibit risk-loving and competitive behavior which offers 
higher cash payouts. The incentives used in the games might also contribute to the theory that 
poverty, or lack of resources influences behavior. We see a higher level of competition overall 
when the incentives are cash.  
Studying menstrual cycles with a sample full of teenage girls is challenging, as menstrual 
cycles take many years after menarche to achieve regularity. It is also salient that menstrual 
cycles averages are determined using older women in Western countries. This might not be 
widely applicable, and there is a growing acceptance of the fact that menstrual cycles are highly 
variable and existing knowledge is incomplete. Hormones are also heavily influenced by 
nutrition. We can surmise from context that our subjects are living in resource-poor conditions 
and might be malnourished, which affects their behavior in games. Measurement error could 
also be a contribution to the lack of significance with the menstruation variables.  
  
This study also looked at the impact of ideas about menstruation, and menstruation itself as an 
indicator of personal well-being. We see that girls who experience menstruation are more 
likely to feel negatively about themselves during menstruation and harbor negative feelings 
towards menstruation. They are also more likely to be stressed out, and less likely to be happy.  
The insights from this study point to the fact that being resource poor and going through 
unavoidable processes like menstruation is an odious affair. Further study needs to focus on 
more detailed measurements of the menstrual cycle, and a detailed chart for everyone in our 
sample. It is interesting that the girls in our sample don’t follow behavior prescribed by 
previous literature, and this fact warrants further examination. Using a detailed menstrual 
cycle chart will help solidify these results. It is also necessary that we accept the fact that girls 
in poor countries lack resources to manage their menstrual health, and further studies need to 
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Appendix-A: Tables and Figures 
  
 Figure 1: Stages of the Menstrual Cycle  
 
  








Table 1: Balance Table 
Factor Non-Menstruating Menstruating p-value 





   Jss-1 17.9% 6.9% 2.6 
   Jss-2 60.7% 60.3% 0 
   Jss-3 21.4% 21.4% 0 
   Ss-1 0.0% 9.2% 2.6 
   Ss-2 0.0% 2.3% 0.4 
    





    
Religion 
   
   Muslim 89.3% 86.3% 0 
   Christian 10.7% 13.7% 0.2 
    
Tribe 
   
   Temne 57.1% 53.4% 0.1 
   Mende 17.9% 22.1% 0.2 
   Krio 7.1% 7.6% 0 
    





    
Living in Poly House 
   
   0 57.1% 57.3% 0 
   1 42.9% 42.7% 0 
    
Risk Preference 
   
   1= Least Risk Loving 14.29% 20.61% 0.5 
   2 14.29% 15.27% 0 
   3 42.86% 24.43% 2.8 
   4 17.86% 25.19% 0.5 














 Dependent variable: 
 RISK SCORE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Position from Peak 
Ovulation 
0.023 0.023 0.022 0.008 0.008 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) 
Age  0.157 0.154 -0.045 -0.044 
  (0.110) (0.110) (0.099) (0.100) 
Siblings  -0.047    
  (0.071)    
Poly-house   0.035   
   (0.342)   
Largo- Kenema    -1.824*** -1.879*** 
    (0.412) (0.651) 
Blama- Kenema    -3.122*** -3.177*** 
    (0.447) (0.671) 
Mankneh- Makeni    -2.545*** -2.515*** 
    (0.506) (0.539) 
Timbo- Makeni    -1.162** -1.133** 
    (0.468) (0.501) 
Temne     -0.055 
     (0.441) 
Mende     0.056 
     (0.657) 
Constant 3.814*** 1.498 1.403 6.095*** 6.084*** 
 (0.191) (1.724) (1.722) (1.627) (1.694) 
Observations 131 131 131 131 131 
R2 0.020 0.038 0.035 0.331 0.331 
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.015 0.012 0.298 0.287 
Residual Std. Error 
1.912 (df = 
129) 
1.909 (df = 
127) 
1.912 (df = 
127) 
1.612 (df = 124) 
1.625 (df = 
122) 
F Statistic 
2.593 (df = 
1; 129) 
1.680 (df = 
3; 127) 
1.529 (df = 
3; 127) 
10.216*** (df = 
6; 124) 
7.544*** (df = 
8; 122) 





























Table 3: Risk behavior segregated by phases 
Risk Preferences 
 Dependent variable: 
 RISK_SCORE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pre-Menstrual 0.494 0.233 0.246 0.304 0.327 
 (0.790) (0.787) (0.789) (0.789) (0.791) 
Luteal  1.070*** 1.064** 1.146*** 1.193*** 
  (0.409) (0.410) (0.413) (0.417) 
Ovulatory   0.192 0.178 0.202 
   (0.505) (0.504) (0.505) 
Follicular    0.447 0.485 
    (0.317) (0.320) 
Kenema     0.310 
     (0.288) 
Makeni     0.152 
     (0.294) 
Constant 3.506*** 3.411*** 3.400*** 3.314*** 3.173*** 
 (0.122) (0.126) (0.129) (0.143) (0.203) 
Observations 253 253 253 253 253 
R2 0.002 0.028 0.029 0.036 0.041 
Adjusted R2 -0.002 0.020 0.017 0.021 0.018 
Residual Std. 
Error 
1.912 (df = 
251) 
1.890 (df = 
250) 
1.894 (df = 
249) 
1.890 (df = 
248) 
1.893 (df = 
246) 
F Statistic 
0.391 (df = 1; 
251) 
3.623** (df = 2; 
250) 
2.455* (df = 3; 
249) 
2.344* (df = 4; 
248) 
1.753 (df = 6; 
246) 







   
  































Table 4: Competition for Cash 
 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Round 3- Choice of Tournament 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Position from Peak Ovulation -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age  0.015 0.013 0.017 0.024 
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) 
      
      
RISK SCORE   0.002 0.003 0.004 
   (0.021) (0.025) (0.024) 
      
Probability of winning    0.0004 0.001 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
      
Confidence in Performance    0.003 0.002 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
      
Largo-Kenema    0.313** 0.185 
    (0.130) (0.181) 
      
Blama-Kenema    -0.068 -0.190 
    (0.158) (0.199) 
      
Mankneh- Makeni    0.093 0.084 
    (0.158) (0.166) 
      
Timbo-Makeni    0.041 0.026 
    (0.136) (0.144) 
Temne     0.177 
     (0.117) 
Mende     0.225 
     (0.177) 
      
Constant 0.687*** 0.491 0.452 0.325 0.077 
 (0.045) (0.408) (0.410) (0.528) (0.549) 
      
Observations 131 131 131 130 130 
R2 0.015 0.025 0.023 0.153 0.175 
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.002 -0.008 0.090 0.098 
Residual Std. Error 
0.450 (df = 
129) 
0.451 (df = 
127) 
0.454 (df = 
126) 
0.432 (df = 120) 0.430 (df = 118) 
F Statistic 
1.911 (df = 1; 
129) 
1.105 (df = 3; 
127) 
0.746 (df = 4; 
126) 
2.415** (df = 9; 
120) 
2.277** (df = 11; 
118) 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
  
 
Table 5: Competition for Prize 
 Dependent variable: 
 R4_CHOICE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
diffpeak 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
AGE  0.017 0.005 0.294 0.247 
  (0.035) (0.028) (0.375) (0.380) 
SIB  -0.070**    
  (0.034)    
age2    -0.009 -0.007 
    (0.012) (0.012) 
polyhouse   -0.075 0.012 0.010 
   (0.085) (0.090) (0.092) 
RISK_SCORE   -0.016 -0.004 -0.004 
   (0.022) (0.026) (0.026) 
sc1    -0.160 -0.197 
    (0.133) (0.193) 
sc2    -0.007 -0.046 
    (0.152) (0.209) 
sc3    0.250 0.227 
    (0.160) (0.168) 
sc4    -0.242 -0.266* 
    (0.147) (0.157) 
temne     0.108 
     (0.128) 
mende     0.079 
     (0.190) 
Constant 0.688*** 0.739 0.696 -1.699 -1.393 
 (0.047) (0.527) (0.429) (2.962) (3.000) 
Observations 131 75 131 131 131 
R2 0.004 0.059 0.014 0.106 0.111 
Adjusted R2 -0.004 0.019 -0.017 0.039 0.029 
Residual Std. 
Error 
0.472 (df = 129) 0.454 (df = 71) 0.475 (df = 126) 0.462 (df = 121) 0.464 (df = 119) 
F Statistic 
0.481 (df = 1; 
129) 
1.476 (df = 3; 
71) 
0.449 (df = 4; 
126) 
1.589 (df = 9; 
121) 
1.355 (df = 11; 
119) 



















 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Female*Treatment 0.0310 0.0310 0.0318 0.0318 
 (0.0763) (0.0763) (0.0768) (0.0768) 
Female -0.106* -0.107* -0.111* -0.111* 
 (0.0579) (0.0580) (0.0579) (0.0568) 
Treatment 0.0319 0.0319 0.0319 0.0319 
 (0.0605) (0.0605) (0.0607) (0.0607) 
RISK SCORE  0.00689 0.00828 0.00853 
  (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0124) 
Probability of win   0.000259 1.89e-06 
   (0.00118) (0.00126) 
Confidence in 
performance 
  0.00161* 0.00153 
   (0.000892) (0.000931) 
Largo-Kenema    -0.0125 
    (0.0706) 
Blama-Kenema    -0.114 
    (0.0791) 
Mankneh- Makeni    0.0760 
    (0.0837) 
Timbo-Makeni    -0.224*** 
    (0.0720) 
Constant 0.766*** 0.743*** 0.733*** 0.807*** 
 (0.0459) (0.0592) (0.0964) (0.145) 
     
Observations 506 506 502 502 
Number of NID 253 253 251 251 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Menstruate*Treatment -0.0971 -0.0971 -0.102 -0.102 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.121) (0.121) 
Menstruate 0.0646 0.0647 0.103 0.0682 
 (0.0964) (0.0967) (0.0980) (0.0994) 
Treatment 0.143 0.143 0.148 0.148 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.111) (0.111) 
RISK SCORE  -0.000385 0.00132 0.00529 
  (0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0180) 
Probability of win   -0.000362 -0.000250 
   (0.00160) (0.00174) 
Confidence in performance   0.00243** 0.00236* 
   (0.00122) (0.00126) 
Largo-Kenema    0.0856 
    (0.0979) 
Blama-Kenema    -0.0393 
    (0.115) 
Mankneh- Makeni    0.129 
    (0.116) 
Timbo-Makeni    -0.130 
    (0.101) 
Constant 0.607*** 0.608*** 0.606*** 0.606*** 
 (0.0875) (0.102) (0.142) (0.219) 
     
Observations 318 318 314 314 














Feelings about School 
 Dependent variable: 
 school_index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PERIOD -0.010 0.020 0.019 0.014 0.010 
 (0.090) (0.107) (0.107) (0.108) (0.109) 
Age  -0.009 -0.009 -0.030 -0.031 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
Sibling  -0.007    
  (0.013)    
Poly-house   0.006   
   (0.065)   
Exam Score    0.010** 0.010** 
    (0.004) (0.004) 
Largo-Kenema    -0.161* -0.200 
 
   (0.096) (0.132) 
Blama-Kenema    -0.370*** -0.405*** 
 
   (0.099) (0.132) 
Mankneh- Makeni    -0.247 -0.254* 
 
   (0.151) (0.153) 
Timbo-Makeni    -0.184** -0.219** 
 
   (0.085) (0.090) 
Temne     0.144* 
 
    (0.084) 
Mende     0.108 
     (0.119) 
Constant 0.009 0.146 0.129 0.075 0.008 
 (0.083) (0.257) (0.257) (0.369) (0.372) 
Observations 810 810 810 810 810 
R2 0.00002 0.001 0.0003 0.029 0.033 
Adjusted R2 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.021 0.022 
Residual Std. 
Error 
0.905 (df = 808) 0.906 (df = 806) 0.906 (df = 806) 0.895 (df = 802) 0.894 (df = 800) 
F Statistic 
0.013 (df = 1; 
808) 
0.188 (df = 3; 
806) 
0.093 (df = 3; 
806) 
3.435*** (df = 7; 
802) 
3.032*** (df = 9; 
800) 














Negative feelings about Periods 
 Dependent variable: 
 Index on Negative feelings on Periods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PERIOD 0.469*** 0.482*** 0.481*** 0.467*** 0.468*** 
 (0.104) (0.124) (0.124) (0.126) (0.126) 
Age  -0.003 -0.004 0.010 0.010 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Sibling  -0.029*    
  (0.015)    
Poly-house   0.049   
   (0.075)   
Exam Score    0.138 0.145 
    (0.111) (0.154) 
Largo-Kenema    0.055 0.062 
 
   (0.114) (0.154) 
Blama-Kenema    0.327* 0.328* 
 
   (0.176) (0.178) 
Mankneh- 
Makeni 
   -0.007 -0.002 
 
   (0.099) (0.105) 
Timbo-Makeni     -0.020 
 
    (0.098) 
Temne     -0.018 
 
    (0.139) 
Constant -0.400*** -0.290 -0.370 -0.609* -0.601* 
 (0.096) (0.296) (0.296) (0.335) (0.339) 
Observations 810 810 810 810 810 
R2 0.025 0.029 0.025 0.030 0.030 
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.026 0.021 0.023 0.021 
Residual Std. 
Error 
1.044 (df = 808) 1.043 (df = 806) 1.045 (df = 806) 1.044 (df = 803) 1.046 (df = 801) 
F Statistic 
20.299*** (df = 1; 
808) 
8.067*** (df = 3; 
806) 
6.902*** (df = 3; 
806) 
4.185*** (df = 6; 
803) 
3.137*** (df = 8; 
801) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
  






 Dependent variable: 
 happiness_index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PERIOD -0.240** -0.217* -0.219* -0.271** -0.272** 
 (0.099) (0.117) (0.117) (0.119) (0.119) 
AGE  -0.007 -0.007 -0.019 -0.016 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
SIB  -0.007    
  (0.014)    
polyhouse   -0.049   
   (0.072)   
EXAM     0.003 
     (0.004) 
Largo-Kenema    -0.239** -0.327** 
 
   (0.105) (0.145) 
Blama-Kenema    -0.300*** -0.384*** 
 
   (0.108) (0.145) 
Mankneh- 
Makeni 
   -0.031 0.015 
 
   (0.166) (0.168) 
Timbo-Makeni    -0.249*** -0.174* 
 
   (0.093) (0.099) 
Temne     -0.193** 
 
    (0.093) 
Mende     0.042 
     (0.131) 
Constant 0.240*** 0.346 0.348 0.715** 0.580 
 (0.091) (0.281) (0.281) (0.316) (0.409) 
Observations 810 810 810 810 810 
R2 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.023 0.029 
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.016 0.018 
Residual Std. 
Error 
0.990 (df = 808) 0.991 (df = 806) 0.990 (df = 806) 0.985 (df = 803) 0.983 (df = 800) 
F Statistic 
5.917** (df = 1; 
808) 
2.089 (df = 3; 
806) 
2.162* (df = 3; 
806) 
3.125*** (df = 6; 
803) 
2.688*** (df = 9; 
800) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
  










 Dependent variable: 
 Stress index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PERIOD 0.410*** 0.448*** 0.448*** 0.548*** 0.540*** 
 (0.100) (0.119) (0.119) (0.118) (0.118) 
Age  -0.013 -0.012 0.008 0.007 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Sibling  0.021    
  (0.014)    
Poly-house   -0.048   
   (0.073)   
Largo-Kenema    0.291*** 0.213 
 
   (0.104) (0.144) 
Blama-Kenema    0.646*** 0.576*** 
    (0.107) (0.143) 
      
Mankneh- 
Makeni 
   -0.096 -0.113 
    (0.165) (0.166) 
      
Timbo-Makeni    -0.031 -0.102 
    (0.093) (0.098) 
      
Temne     0.293*** 
     (0.091) 
      
Mende     0.215* 
     (0.129) 
Constant -0.322*** -0.204 -0.141 -0.708** -0.813** 
 (0.092) (0.285) (0.285) (0.314) (0.315) 
Observations 810 810 810 810 810 
R2 0.020 0.024 0.021 0.077 0.089 
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.020 0.018 0.070 0.080 
Residual Std. 
Error 
1.004 (df = 808) 1.003 (df = 806) 1.004 (df = 806) 0.977 (df = 803) 0.972 (df = 801) 
F Statistic 
16.836*** (df = 1; 
808) 
6.468*** (df = 3; 
806) 
5.876*** (df = 3; 
806) 
11.112*** (df = 6; 
803) 
9.826*** (df = 8; 
801) 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
  








Unique ID: … … 
 




Community where the respondent’s house is: 
_______________________________________ 
 








Mobile of first guardian: ___________________________ 











Name of Respondent: _________________________ 
 
  


















How many siblings of the “same mother and father” do you have? If yes in 




1.2.2  How many siblings of different mother or father do you 






What grade are you enrolled in? Class 6                                               1 
JSS 1                                                 2 
JSS 2                                                 3 
JSS 3                                                 4 
SS 1                                                  5 
SS 2                                                  6 
SS 3                                                  7 











What is your religion? 
 Muslim……………………………1 
Christian………………………… .2 





































Please tell me how much time (in hours) you spend on these activities on any 
given school day (on average) [Go one by one]:  
 
1. Helping to cook: _______ 
2. Collecting water: _______ 
3. Cleaning the home -   
4. Washing clothes: _______ 
5. Looking after siblings, elderly, or disabled family 
members: _______ 
6. Gathering fuel or firewood: _______ 
 
Please tell me how much time (in hours) you spend on these activities on any 
given Non-school day (on average) [Go one by one]:  
1. Helping to cook: _______ 
2. Collecting water: _______ 
3. Cleaning the home  
4. Washing clothes: _______ 
5. Looking after siblings, elderly, or disabled family 
members: _______ 
6. Gathering fuel or firewood: _______ 
 
Do you currently perform any income generating activity?  
1=Yes (both regular & irregular) 
 2=No 
 
If yes, how frequently do you do the income generating activity? 
a. Daily 
b. Weekly 
c. Once every two weeks 
d. Monthly 
e. Other:________ 
f. Don’t know 
 
 
How far would you be allowed to travel alone to get a job?  
1. Home-based work only  
2. Within the village  
3. Within the district  
4. Another district  
  




2. PERIOD AND WASH IN SCHOOLS- EN: Read out all options for each 
question.  
 
• Have you ever had your period?  
1. Yes 
2. No      Don’t ask section 
2.2           
  
3. Don't know 
 
 




2.1 School Information: 
 
2.1.1.How do you feel about the following in school? EN: Read out all options for 
each question. 
2.1.11 Studying 2.1.12 Sports 2.1.13 Dancing/Singing Activities 2.1.14 
Socializing with friends 
 
I dislike it very much 1 
I dislike it 2 
Neither like or dislike 3 
I enjoy it 4 
I enjoy it very much 5 
Refuse to answer -99  
I dislike it very much 1 
I dislike it 2 
Neither like or dislike 3 
I enjoy it 4 
I enjoy it very much 5 
Refuse to answer                                 -99             
I dislike it very much 1 
I dislike it 2 
Neither like or dislike 3 
  
I enjoy it 4 
I enjoy it very much 5 
Refuse to answer                     -99                  
I dislike it very much           1 
I dislike it                             2 
Neither like or dislike     3      
I enjoy it                               4  
I enjoy it very much             5  
Refuse to answer           -99 
 
  
• What was your “exam’s score in percentage” in your 
[only] third term of the last academic year? ____________ 
 
2.1.2. (Add a disclaimer- it’s okay to miss school) In a normal month how often do 
you miss school because of _________________?  
 
EN: Read out options each time Never  Once or twice  Several 
times  Many times. 
2.1.21 Housework   1  2 3 4  
2.1.22 Looking after brothers and sisters  1 2 3 4 
2.1.23 Illness  1  2 3 4  
2.1.24 Period   1  2 3 4  
2.1.25 Lack of money   1 2 3  4 
2.1.3. How many days of school have you missed in the last two weeks? 
_____________________________________ 
 
2.1.4. In your school, do you talk about the following? 
 




Don’t know……………………..-96  
Yes……………………………….1 
No…………………………….......2 
Don’t know……………………..- 96 
 
 






Don’t know……………………..-96 RESPONSE CODE  
>>2.1.53 
2.1.52  Soap at the station Yes……………………………….1 
No…………………………….......2 
Don’t know……………………..-96 RESPONSE CODE  
2.1.53 Disposal for period products
 Yes……………………………….1 
No…………………………….......2 
Don’t know……………………..-96 RESPONSE CODE  
2.1.54 Toilets/Latrines Yes……………………………….1 
No…………………………….......2 






How far are toilets/latrines from classroom?  
Next to classroom……………………… 
In school building………………………. 
Outside, compound…………………… 
Other…………………………………… 






-99   
 
2.1.7  
Who are the toilets/latrines for?  
Female staff/students…………………………………... 
Female students only………………………………………… 
All students and staff…………………………………… 






-99   
 
2.1.8  
When you need toilets/latrines during your Period, are those toilets available for 
you to use?  
 Yes, easily available 
Yes, availed with difficultyNo…………………………………………… 
Don’t know…………………………………………….  
1 
2 
-96   
 
2.1.9  
When can you use the toilet/latrines? 
Any time 
Only during breaks 













MENSTRUAL EDUCATION AND MANAGEMENT 
 
*These questions are regarding what you do during your Period. It may be 
embarrassing, but it is important to talk about it.  Please answer to the best of 
your knowledge. Remember your answers will always stay anonymous, no one 
except the researchers will ever know what you said.*     
 
2.2.1  
Who first talked to you about Period?  






School teacher not in a lesson 
School lesson 
Other: Doctor 
Other: other person 
No one 













   
 
2.2.2  
When did you learn about Period?  
Before start 
When I got my first period 
After I got my first period 





   
 
2.2.3  
If Answered School lesson in 2.2.1: How is menstrual-period issue taught at 
school?   
Part of general health hygiene lesson 
Part of human biology lesson 
  
Person from another organization 
Other  






   -99 
   
 
2.2.4  
If Answered School lesson in 2.2.1: Girls only lesson?   
Yes, girls only ……………….. 
No, boys too………………… 
Don’t know…………………..  
1 
2 
-96   
 
2.2.5  
Have you ever been given any written materials on Menstrual Health 
Management?   
Yes……………………………… 
No………………………………. 
Don’t know………………………  
1 
2 
-96   
 
2.2.7  













   
 
2.2.8  
Some people wash themselves when they are menstruating. When you are 
menstruating, what do you do about cleaning?  
 
 Bathe daily 
Bathe when needed 
No extra cleaning 
No bathing during period 
Other 







     6 
 95 
-99   
2.2.9 When menstruating, are you allowed to do the following? 
   
2.2.91 Praying inside mosque/church   
Yes……………………………………… 
No……………………………………… 




2.2.92 Praying at home   
Yes……………………………………… 
No……………………………………… 












2.2.94 Sleeping arrangements- do you have to sleep somewhere 
else?   
Yes……………………………………… 
No……………………………………… 




2.2.95 Going to school.   
Yes……………………………………… 
No……………………………………… 





2.2.96 At school, doing sports.    
Yes……………………………………… 
No……………………………………… 




2.2.97 At school, singing/dancing activities   
Yes……………………………………… 
No……………………………………… 




2.2.98 Family and social gatherings   
Yes……………………………………… 
No……………………………………… 






2.2.6 When was the first day of your last period?  
______________________________    
2.2.10 How long was your cycle last two months?  
[Write 99 if don’t know or don’t want to answer]  
Open ended answer  
   




   Open-ended answer 
 
2.2.12  
If you have taken days off from school during your period, what is the main 
reason? 
 
(EN: Select all that apply)  
Pain is main reason 
Unwell, dizzy, or tired 
Fear of leaking 
No item to deal with bleeding 
Fear of smell 
Good time for home chores 
Good time to rest 
No place/bathroom to wash yourself 











   
2.2.13  




Don’t know  
1 
2 
-96   
 
2.2.14  
Is Changing pads/menstrual products easy in school?  
Can always change in school  
Can sometimes change 
Can never change in school 






   
2.2.15  
What happens if you can’t wash/change?  
Stay dirty until time to go home  
Go home, then clean up and return 
Go home and stay home 






   
2.2.16  
Disposal of  menstrual-period products at school 
 


















   95 
  
-99 
   
 
 
3. Self-Esteem Measures: 
 
• Do you face teasing/harassment from boys in the school 
or in the class?  
1=Yes  
2=No 
 3=No response  
 
• If yes, what do you do about teasing & harassment from 
boys at school?(Select all that apply) 
o 1= Nothing  
o 2=Scolded him  
o 3=Walked away  
o 4=Got angry  
o 5=Complained to my parents  
o 6=Complained to a teacher  
o 7=Became friends with the boy 
o 8=Got sad  
o 9=Stopped going to school  
o 10=Tried to avoid going to school  
o 11=Told my friends  
o 12=Other (specify) 
 
Below are statements about your feelings that you may agree or disagree with. 
Using the 1 - 7 scale below, indicate your agreement where 1 means disagreement 
  
& 7 means high agreement with the statement. Please be open and honest in your 
responses.  
 
a. I feel helpless. 
b. I am driven and motivated to work hard.  
c. I expect good things to happen to me in the future. 
 
d. I have no confidence in myself.  
e. I feel like my life has importance.  
f. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself 
g. I feel that I have a number of good qualities 
h. I am able to do things as well as most other people 
i. I feel that my life will improve in the future 
3.5 During Period, I feel confident.  Strongly disagree 
Disagree 
Slightly disagree 













3.6 During Period, I feel polluted. Strongly disagree 
Disagree 
Slightly disagree 













3.7 During Period, I feel very social. Strongly disagree 
Disagree 
Slightly disagree 












3.8 During Period, I feel embarrassed. Strongly disagree 
Disagree 
Slightly disagree 












3.9 During Period, I feel isolated.  Strongly disagree 
Disagree 
Slightly disagree 













3.10 I feel good today. Strongly disagree 
Disagree 
Slightly disagree 












3.11 I feel confident today. Strongly disagree 
Disagree 
Slightly disagree 





























3.13 In the future, I want to have a job. Strongly disagree 
Disagree 
Slightly disagree 












3.14 In the future, I want to own a business. Strongly disagree 
Disagree 
Slightly disagree 













3.15 In the future, I want a government job. Strongly disagree 
Disagree 
Slightly disagree 












3.16 In the future, I want a bank job. Strongly disagree 
Disagree 
Slightly disagree 





























3.18 In the future, I want a job in the services sector. 
For example- Accounting, Law, Business Admin Strongly disagree 
Disagree 
Slightly disagree 













How often does the following happen?  
1. I get easily annoyed at other people.  
2. I shout at people.  
3. I feel anxious.  
4. I worry about the future.  
5. I feel sad.  
6. I want to be alone 
 
To what degree do you agree with these statements? Choose from strongly 
disagree, Disagree, Slightly disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Slightly agree,  
Agree, Strongly agree 
• Refuse to answer 
1. A wife should obey her husband, even if she disagrees.  
2. · It is important for a man to show his wife/partner who 
is the boss.  
3. It is the job of men to be leaders, not women  
4. If a woman has power in the household, it means she is 
taking power away from her husband  
  
5. A husband and wife can share power  
6. Women’s opinions are valuable and should always be 
considered when household decisions are made  
 
• Would you want to continue your education after 
marriage? 1=Yes 2=No  
• If yes, would you be allowed to continue your education 
after marriage?  
1. Yes  2. No 
• Over the past four weeks, have you encountered any of 


















1. Imagine you have won a sum of money. How would you 
like to be paid? 
a. 100,000 le now 
b. 150,000 le in 6 months 
c. Anyhow 
 
2. Would you rather have 100,000 now or 250,000 in 6 
months? 
a. 100,000 le now 




3. Are you generally more risk-taking or do you avoid 
taking risks? 










Experimental Instructions — School Children age 13-20 
 
Tokens = Cash Tokens = School Supplies (gender neutral) 
 
Boys = 15 per schoolTotal Boys = 100 
Girls = 30 per school Total Girls = 180 
 Total School Children: 280 
 
Games being played:  COMPETITION 
 RISK  
 WILLINGNESS TO PAY (CASH OR GN PRIZE) 
Competition Game Rounds: 
● Round 1 PR = piece rate cash 
● Round 2 MT = mandatory tournament cash (random student in the room chosen prior) 
● Round 3 CTC = choice to tournament vs piece rate cash (random student in the room) 
● Round 4 CTP = choice to tournament vs piece rate prize (random student in the room) 
Risk and Willingness to Pay: 
● Round 1 = Risk cash 
● Round 2 = Willingness to Pay prize 
 
Enumerator Instructions for the Games: 
 
Hello everyone, thank you for being here today! 
Let me start by telling you a little bit about what we are doing today. I am employed by BRAC 
and I am collecting data for a research project that is in collaboration with University of San 
Francisco (California, USA). We will be conducting a few activities that we would like you all to 
participate in. Everyone who participates will have an opportunity to either win a useful prize or 
a little amount of money. This session will last around an hour of your time.Do you want to 
participate? 
● If yes, continue to Consent. 
● If no, please encourage them to play in the game because their time and data is very 
valuable to us and they have chances to win prizes. 
  
● If they still say no, they can go back to class.  
 
Consent: 
If at any point you want to contact the researchers, feel free to contact Madison Levine 
(melevine2@usfca.edu) and Ashwini Shridhar (ashridhar@usfca.edu), the main researchers. The 
faculty corresponding with this research is Alessandra Cassar (acassar@usfca.edu). If at any 
point you do not want to continue participating, you are free to stop. This is a completely 
voluntary study. We require that you sign a consent form to participate in this study. 
 
(Enumerator has all school children sign the consent form) 
 
It is important that you listen as carefully as possible, because your success in these tasks 
requires understanding exactly. You can ask as many questions as you would like. The activities 
are 3 games with a few rounds in them. It will take around 1 hour.  
 
Rules: 
We do ask that you follow a few rules. 
1. You cannot talk to any of your classmates during the activities. We want all of your 
decisions and input to be only yours, and not anyone else’s.  
2. You cannot leave once the activities have begun. If you need a break, or use the bathroom, 
this can be done between the activities.  
3. If you have a mobile phone, that is not allowed at any point during the activities.  
4. Once the session is over, we ask that you do not talk about this with any friends. This is 
because we will be conducting the same activities with others in the same region and the 
study relies on true, uninfluenced responses of each participant.  
If these rules are broken, we will have to end the process and you will be asked to leave. 
 
Does everyone understand? Are there any questions? Please make sure if you have a mobile 
phone that you turn that off right now. Thank you. 
 
Payments:  
Each activity involves either money or prizes. The money is real money and the prizes are real 
prizes. To determine your payout, at the end of all the activities I will randomly select one out of 
the six rounds to be the payout. We will use a die since there are six sides to a die and each 
round has a 1/6 chance to be chosen.  
Here is how it would be done: 
● For example, If you get a 1, you are paid out for the 1st round played today. 
If you get a 2, you are paid out for the 2nd round played today. 
If you get a 3, you are paid out for the 3rd round played today. 
If you get a 4, you are paid out for the 4th round played today. 
If you get a 5, you are paid out for the 5th round played today. 
If you get a 6, you are paid out for the 6th round played today. 
 
Do you understand the payout structure? Are there any questions? 
 
  
CASH TREATMENTS: Before we begin the games, each of you will receive one token, the 
same as what you will receive during the games. Enumerator hand out a token to each student. 
Each token is worth 1,000 leones. Now I will show you how many leones you can buy with the 
tokens you acquire throughout the games. Take out leones. For each token, you can get 1,000 
leones. After the students understand the token/leone exchange, take back the tokens from 
students and continue rest of instructions. 
 
PRIZE TREATMENTS: Before we begin the games, each of you will receive one token, the 
same as what you will receive during the games. Give one token to each student. Now I will 
show you the prize that can be “bought” by the tokens that have been acquired throughout the 
games. There will be prizes with different costs. Show the different prizes and costs. After the 
students understand the token/prize exchange, take back the tokens from students and begin the 
game instructions. 
 




This activity requires adding simple mathematic equations together. There are 4 rounds in this 
activity. During each round you will have 3 minutes to complete as many of the 10 summation 
equations given to you. You are allowed to use scratch paper, but calculators are not allowed. 
For example, 1+5+3+2+1 = ? 
 
The question will look like: 
 1+ | 5+| 3+| 2+| 1= ? 
 
The answer will look like: 
 1+ | 5+| 3+| 2+| 1= 12  
 
Each of the rounds have slightly different rules and they will be explained before each round. 
 
Round 1: “Piece-Rate” 
 
In this game, your payout will be determined by the number of problems you answer correctly in 
the three-minute time limit.  
For each correct answer, you will receive 1 token. 
We will convert the tokens you receive into your payout based on the conversion rate. Please 
look at the chalkboard with the rates. We call this payout method “piece rate”. 
[Note: at this point enumerator writes on the chalkboard “1 token = 1,000 leones”] 
We will tell you your score after grading your answers. But remember, do not look at anyone 
else’s score and do not let others see your score.  
 
IMPORTANT TO EXPLAIN: If you select this task in the drawing, then this game is the only 
game for which you will receive payout today. 
 
      Round 2: “Tournament” 
  
 
In this game, we will randomly and anonymously select one other person in this room to be your 
opponent. This was already selected by the researchers before we came here today. You will not 
know who your opponent is. You and your opponent will form a competition group. Your payout 
depends on whether your answer more questions correctly than your opponent. The one with the 
higher correct answers in each competition group will receive 2 tokens for each correct answer. 
The other person will receive nothing. If you and your opponent have the same number of 
correct answers, you will receive 1 token per correct answer.  
We will convert the tokens you receive into your payout based on the conversion rate. Please see 
the chalkboard. We call this payout method “tournament”.  
[Note: at this point enumerator writes on the chalkboard “1 token = 1,000 leones”] 
We will tell you your score after grading your answers. We will not tell you how well you did 
relative to your opponent. Do not look at anyone else’s score and do not let others see your score. 
  
IMPORTANT TO EXPLAIN: If you select this task in the drawing, then this game is the only 
game for which you will receive payout today.  
 
Round 3: “Choice Cash” 
 
In this game, you choose your own payout method. You can choose either the “piece rate” 
payout method or the “tournament” method. Regardless of the method you choose, the tokens 
you receive will be converted into cash to be issued to you. Please see the chalkboard. 
[Note: At this point, enumerator writes on the chalkboard “1 token = 1,000 leones”] 
 
If you choose the “piece rate” payout method, you will receive 1 token for each correct answer. 
 
If you choose the “tournament” payout method, your payout depends on your number of correct 
answers in this game and your opponent’s answers in the “Tournament” game (round 2). If your 
number of correct answers in this game is higher than that of your opponents in the 
“Tournament” of round 2 game, you will receive 2 tokens for each correct answer in this game. 
(The payout for each correct answer will be 2 times the payout for each correct answer under the 
“piece-rate” payout method. If your number of correct answers in this game and your opponent’s 
number of correct answers in the “Tournament” game are the same, for each correct answer you 
will receive 1 token. If your opponent in the “Tournament” game answered more problems 
correctly than you do in this game, you will receive nothing. 
 
For example, suppose both you and your opponent choose the “tournament” payout method, and 
your scores are as follows: 
 You  Your Opponent 
Score in “Tournament” round  3  3 
Score in “Choice (Cash)” 
round 
4  2 
Payout in “Choice (Cash)” 
round 
 8 tokens  0 tokens 
  
 
Then you will receive 8 tokens because your score of 4 is higher than your opponent’s score of 3 
in the “Tournament” round. Your opponent will receive nothing because his or her score of 2 in 
“Choice (Cash)” round is lower than your score of 3 in the “Tournament” round.  
 
We will tell you your score after grading your answers. If you picked “Tournament” we will not 
tell you how well you did relative to your opponent. Do not look at anyone else’s score and do 
not let others see your score.  
 
IMPORTANT TO EXPLAIN: If you select this task in the drawing, then this game is the only 
game for which you will potentially receive the payout today.  
Please circle your choice on the card — “piece rate” payout method or “tournament” payout 
method. If you are unclear about any of the instructions, do not make a choice right now. Please 
raise your hand and ask the enumerator for clarification. 
 
Do you understand? Are there any questions? Please circle a choice. 
 
Round 4: “Choice Prize” 
 
This game is very similar to the “Choice (Cash Prize)” game. You will choose your own payout 
method: either the “piece rate” payout method or the “tournament” payout method. What is 
different is: the tokens you receive will be converted into an equal valued prize (for example a 
notebook or a pencil), and not the cash. Please see the chalkboard. 
[Note: at this point the enumerator writes on the chalkboard “1 token = 1,000 leones”] 
If you choose the “piece rate” payout method, you will receive 1 token fo each correct answer. 
If you choose the “tournament” payout method, your payout depends on your number of correct 
answers in this game and your opponent’s number of correct answers in the “Tournament” 
round. If your number of correct answers in this game is higher than that of your opponent’s in 
the “Tournament” round, you will receive 2 tokens for each correct answer in this round (the 
payout for each correct answer will be 2 times the payout for each correct answer under the 
“piece rate” payout method). If your number of correct answers in this game and your 
opponent’s number of correct answers in the “Tournament” round are the same, for each correct 
answer you will receive 1 token. If your opponent in the “Tournament” round answered more 
problems correctly than you do in this game, you will receive nothing. 
 
For example, suppose both you and your opponent choose the “tournament” payout method, and 
your scores are as follows: 
  You  Your Opponent 
Score in “Tournament” round 3  3 
Score in “Choice Prize” round  4  2 




Then you will receive 8 tokens because your score of 4 is higher than your opponent’s score of 3 
in the “Tournament” round.  
Your opponent will receive nothing because his or her score of 2 in “Choice Prize” game is 
lower than your score of 3 in the “Tournament” round. 
 
We will tell you your score after grading your answers. If you picked “Tournament” we will not 
tell you how well you did relative to your opponent. Do not look at anyone else’s score and do 
not let others see your score.  
IMPORTANT TO EXPLAIN: If you select this task in the drawing, then this game is the only 
game for which you will potentially receive payout today.  
Please circle your choice on the card — “piece rate” payout method or “tournament” payout 
method. If you are unclear about any of the instructions, do not make a choice right now. Please 
raise your hand and ask the enumerator for clarification.  
 
Do you understand? Are there any questions? Please circle a choice. 
 
[After the first 4 rounds are completed]: 
 
Evaluation of Opponent 
 
Recall your number of correct answers in the “Tournament” round. Please guess how many 
questions you think your opponent correctly answered in the “Tournament” round. Then write 




This game is not like any of the previous games played. There is no time limit in this game, 
please think carefully and make your choices quickly. 
This game consists of you choosing ONE out of these six lotteries. (Point to the enlarged poster 
or chalkboard of the game itself). Each lottery can be successful or fail, with equal probability. 
We will flip a coin in front of you to decide whether the one lottery you chose is successful or 
not. The rewards indicated on the table are the real, not just hypothetical: at the end of today’s 
session we will pay you in CASH according to what you made during the game IF this round is 
chosen at the very end. Let me explain the lotteries to you all.  
● If you choose Lottery #1 and if it is successful, you will have the opportunity 
to get 10,000 leones. If it fails, you will have the opportunity to get 10,000 
leones as well. Remember, each lottery has a 50% possibility to succeed and a 
50% possibility to fail. (Ask: Any questions so far?) 
● If you choose Lottery #2 and if it is successful, you will have the opportunity 
to get 12,000 leones. If it fails, you will have the opportunity to get 8,000 
leones. Remember, each lottery has a 50% possibility to succeed and a 50% 
possibility to fail. (Ask: Any questions so far?) 
● If you choose Lottery #3 and if it is successful, you will have the opportunity 
to get 14,000 leones. If it fails, you will have the opportunity to get 6,000 
leones. Remember, each lottery has a 50% possibility to succeed and a 50% 
possibility to fail. (Ask: Any questions so far?) 
  
● If you choose Lottery #4 and if it is successful, you will have the opportunity 
to get 16,000 leones. If it fails, you will have the opportunity to get 4,000 
leones. Remember, each lottery has a 50% possibility to succeed and a 50% 
possibility to fail. (Ask: Any questions so far?) 
● If you choose Lottery #5 and if it is successful, you will have the opportunity 
to get 18,000 leones. If it fails, you will have the opportunity to get 2,000 
leones. Remember, each lottery has a 50% possibility to succeed and a 50% 
possibility to fail. (Ask: Any questions so far?) 
● If you choose Lottery #6 and if it is successful, you will have the opportunity 
to get 20,000 leones. If it fails, you will have the opportunity to get 0 leones. 
Remember, each lottery has a 50% possibility to succeed and a 50% 
possibility to fail. (Ask: Any questions so far?) 
 
Reminder: We want your decision to be real. This is why we are giving you real money. Think 
carefully about your choices.  
IMPORTANT TO EXPLAIN: If you select this task in the drawing, this game is the only game for 
which you will potentially receive payout today.  
 
 
Lottery 1 Lottery 4 
 
Failed Successful Failed Successful 
10,000 leones10,000 leones4,000 leones16,000 leones 
 
Lottery 2 Lottery 5 
 
Failed Successful Failed Successful 
8,000 leones12,000 leones2,000 leones18,000 leones 
 
Lottery 3 Lottery 6 
 
Failed Successful  Failed Successful 
6,000 leones14,000 leones Zero leones20,000 leones 
 
 
WILLINGNESS TO PAY ACTIVITY 
 
Now, we will ask that you make choices between cash and a non-cash prizes. There is no time 
limit in this game, please think carefully and make your choices quickly.  
In each of the 10 questions we will ask you, you must make a choice between: option A, a non-
cash prize, and option B, a cash prize. All non-cash prizes are School Supplies. 
We will record your 10 choices, then randomly draw a number from 1-10 to determine which of 
your choices to implement if this round is chosen at the very end.  
IMPORTANT TO EXPLAIN: If you select this round in the drawing, then this round is the only 
round for which you will potentially receive payout today.  
 
  
 Option A: Non Cash 
Prize 
Option B: Cash 
Prizes 
Option Chosen 
 A or B? 
 1 School Supplies 1,000 leones  
 2 School Supplies 2,000 leones  
 3 School Supplies 3,000 leones  
 4 School Supplies 4,000 leones  
 5 School Supplies 5,000 leones  
 6 School Supplies 6,000 leones  
 7 School Supplies 7,000 leones  
 8 School Supplies 8,000 leones  
 9 School Supplies 9,000 leones  
 10 School Supplies 10,000 leones  
 
 
